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A Testament to Inefficacy: Louisiana's New
Legislation Allowing for the Admissibility of Videotape
Evidence in the Probate Process
I. INTRODUCTION
Technology constantly encourages the legal system to adapt to
ever-changing advancements. No area of the law is immune from
this prodding, as these advancements have spurred incredible
changes in both procedural and substantive law. In particular,
legislators have been called upon to implement new developments
in the area of civil procedure. From newly suggested electronic
discovery procedures to the possibility of executing a will through e-
mail, change is on the horizon. While the arguments in favor of
technological advancement are sound, the resulting changes to the
practice of law require practitioners to question whether legislators
are looking with an appropriately discerning eye to the effect that
these developments will and already are exhibiting.'
Newly enacted Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2904
provides for the admissibility at trial of a videotape of a testament's
execution.2 Videotape evidence may be entered in a contradictory
trial to probate a testament or in an action to annul a probated
testament.3 The videotape is to serve as proof of a number of factors
associated with a will's execution.
4
This comment addresses several issues raised by the enactment
of article 2904. Specifically, it argues that article 2904 requires
substantial revision before it can effectively serve the evidentiary
purposes intended by the legislature. 5 To develop this argument,
Copyright 2007, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. See sources cited infra note 33 and accompanying text.
2. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2904 (2006), amended by 2005 La. Acts
No. 79, § 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. The bill's sponsor explained that article 2904 "add[s] the ability to
videotape [the will] .... [T]he judge can use the videotape to determine not
only the soundness of mind but the voluntariness of it and everything else that
perhaps may be beneficial to settle any dispute that may be among family
members." Admissibility of a Videotape of the Execution of a Testament:
Hearing on H.B. 260 Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, Section A, 2005 Legis.,
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Part II explains the grounds for videotape admissibility in the
probate process. Part III focuses specifically on the Louisiana
approach by giving an in-depth analysis of article 2904's
shortcomings, providing corresponding suggestions for legislative
revision, and suggesting the proper interpretation courts should give
to the article. Part IV concludes by offering practical advice to
practitioners who rely on the article's provisions.
II. VIDEOTAPE EVIDENCE
A. Grounds for Videotape Admissibility in the Probate Process
Commentators initially conceived of the role videotape should
play in the probate process during the early 1980s. 6 Prior to that
time, videotapes were extensively utilized in other areas of the law,
particularly criminal law.7 For example, practitioners made use of
tapes to capture defendants' statements, to aid in the conducting of
line-ups, and to film crime scenes. 8 In the civil setting, video
depositions were frequently introduced.9 Despite this widespread
application, the use of videotape evidence in the probate arena did
not receive similar approval. 0  This absence of jurisprudence
derives from the newness of the idea, as well as from the ever-
present controversy surrounding the use of videotape evidence in
this context. In effect, those individuals who are willing to sit in
front of the video camera and who have found a lawyer willing to
stand behind it simply have not yet died." 1 Undoubtedly, though, as
individuals who have grown up with video technology begin the
process of preparing a will, there will be more instances in which
videotape evidence plays a part in the probate process.
31st Reg. Sess. 11 (La. 2005) (statement of Rep. Willie Hunter, Jr.) [hereinafter
Statement of Rep. Hunter].
6. Gerry W. Beyer & William R. Buckley, Videotape and the Probate
Process: The Nexus Grows, 42 OKLA. L. REv. 43, 46 (1989).
7. Id. at 43.
8. Id. at 43-44.
9. Id. at 44-46.
10. Id, at 47.
11. Id. at48.
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When videotape evidence has been introduced in the probate
process, courts generally require some, but not all, of the following
elements to be proven: a voluntarily made tape, proper functioning
of the equipment, competency of the equipment operator, accuracy
of the recording, proper preservation of the recording, absence of
videotape alteration, and accurate identification of the participants of
the execution of the will.
12
As to the purpose served by videotape admissibility, courts often
look to the tape as evidence of "objective" factors, such as proper
execution and authenticity of the testament, as well as more
"subjective" factors, including the existence of testamentary
capacity and the absence of undue influence. 13  Regarding the
objective factors, a videotape can document the presence of the
witnesses required for proper execution. 14 The video can also serve
as proof that the testator signed the document himself in the
presence of the witnesses' 5 and can insure against subsequent
alterations of the document's contents by individually recording
each page of the testament.16 This forestalling of physical alteration
also exists in cases where the testator reads the entire will aloud.'7
The controversial nature of videotape admissibility arises with
respect to the subjective factors. As will be explained in greater
detail below, videotape evidence has been touted for its ability to
reveal both the existence of testamentary capacity and the absence
of undue influence in will executions. Commentators argue that a
videotape of the will execution ceremony would allow the testator to
appear "Personally" before the court and state his or her intentions
directly. This approach, however, is too simplistic in that it fails to
consider the possibility that the testator's words may not be an
12. Gerry W. Beyer, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES: TEXAS LAW OF WILLS § 52.19
(3d ed. West 2002) (1968), available at 10 TXPRAC § 52.19 (Westlaw).
13. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2904 (2006) (amended 2005).
14. Beyer & Buckley, supra note 6, at 57.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 58.
17. William R. Buckley, Indiana's New Videotaped Wills Statute:
Launching Probate Into the 21st Century, 20 VAL. U. L. REv. 83, 89 (1985).
18. William R. Buckley & Alfred W. Buckley, Videotaped Wills, 89 CASE
& COMMENT 3, 4 (1984).
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accurate reflection of his intentions, no matter how "directly" he
states them.
B. The Approaches of Other States to Videotape Admissibility in the
Probate Process
Several states have adopted different approaches to videotape
admissibility. Some states have ethical guides on the use of
videotaped wills. Others have considered legislation on the matter
and rejected it. Still others have adopted specific laws with
standards for admissibility of videotaped wills.
The Supreme Court of Ohio put forth its attitude toward the use
of videotape evidence in the probate process through an advisory
opinion issued in 1988. Opting to treat the matter as one involving
the duty of care owed by lawyers to clients, the Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline confirmed that
videotaping the reading and execution of a will does not violate the
Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility. 19 The board directed all
interested lawyers to a reference manual for continuing legal
education published by the Ohio Legal Center Institute. 2°  The
manual guides lawyers in their decision to videotape a will
execution ceremony by outlining the advantages and disadvantages
of videotaping a will and providing guidelines as to what should be
included in the videotape itself.
21
Other states, such as Texas and New Jersey, approach the matter
more as an evidentiary issue than an ethical one. In 1985, the Texas
Legislature drafted a bill seeking to amend the Texas Probate Code
to allow for the admissibility of videotape as evidence of the
testator's identity, competency, and "any other matter relating to the
will and its validity.' 22  Similarly, the New Jersey House of
Representatives drafted a bill in 1986 that would have allowed
videotape to serve not only as evidence of proper execution and
19. The Supreme Court of Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances
and Discipline, Formal Op. 88-014 (June 17, 1988), available at
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/boc/advisoryopinions/1988/op%2088-014.doc.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. S.B. 732, 69th Leg. (Tex. 1985); H.B. 247, 69th Leg. (Tex. 1985). See
also Beyer & Buckley, supra note 6, at 70.
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testamentary capacity, but also as a will itself as long as a written
version was also created.23 Neither bill, however, was ever enacted
by the respective state legislatures.
The New York State Senate also proposed a bill in 1987 that
would have added section 1407-a to the Surrogate's Court
Procedure Act.24 This new section provided for the admissibility of
videotape to prove the validity of a will.25 Despite the legislature's
refusal to enact this video-will statute, the Supreme Court of New
York in 1994 jurisprudentially determined that the videotape of a
will execution ceremony is admissible in circumstances where the
videotape is offered not as a will to be probated, but rather as
evidence of the decedent's testamentary capacity.
26
In 1988, Indiana became the first state to enact legislation
allowing for the admissibility of videotape evidence in the probate
process. The new section of the Indiana Probate Code provided:
"Subject to the applicable Indiana rules of trial procedure, a
videotape may be admissible as evidence of the proper execution of
a will." 7 Following an amendment in 1989 expanding the use of
videotape evidence, the current language of the provision reads:
(c) Subject to the applicable Indiana Rules of Trial
Procedure, a videotape may be admissible as evidence of
the following:
(1) The proper execution of a will.
(2) The intentions of a testator.
(3) The mental state or capacity of a testator.
(4) The authenticity of a will.
(5) Matters that are determined by a court to be
relevant to the probate of a will.
29
23. Assemb. B. 3030, 202d Leg., 1st yr. Sess. (N.J. 1986), cited in Beyer &
Buckley, supra note 6, at 74.
24. Beyer & Buckley, supra note 6, at 72 n.134.
25. S.B. 5098, 210th Leg., 1987-88 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1987); Beyer &
Buckley, supra note 6, at 73. See also id. at 70.
26. In re Estate of Burack, 607 N.Y.S.2d 711, 712 (N.Y. 1994).
27. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-3(d) (Bums Supp. 1988). See also Beyer &
Buckley, supra note 6, at 69.
28. Id. at 70.
29. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-3.2 (West 2006).
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In other words, videotape is admissible as proof that all of the
statutory requirements for a testamentary instrument have been
met.30 One commentator explained that the Indiana Legislature was
willing to adopt this provision based on the predisposition of Indiana
courts to rely on videotape as evidence in other areas of the law,
including both the criminal and civil arenas.3
1
III. THE LOUISIANA APPROACH: CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
ARTICLE 2904
Louisiana is the latest state to address the use of videotape
evidence in the probate process. Following the lead of Indiana,
Louisiana has chosen to enact a statute explicitly setting forth both
the requirements for videotape admissibility and the evidentiary
function the videotape is to serve.
A. The Text of Article 2904 and the History Behind Its Adoption
Newly enacted Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2904
states:
Article 2904. Admissibility of videotape of execution of
testament
A. In a contradictory trial to probate a testament under
Article 2901 or an action to annul a probated testament
under Article 2931, and provided the testator is sworn by
a person authorized to take oaths and the oath is recorded
on the videotape, the videotape of the execution and
reading of the testament by the testator may be
admissible as evidence of any of the following:
(1) The proper execution of the testament.
(2) The intentions of the testator.
(3) The mental state or capacity of the testator.
30. Buckley, supra note 17, at 92.
31. Id. at 85. Examples of this reliance include using videotape as evidence
of "defendants' statements and confessions; . . . line-ups; and . . . law
enforcement sting operations," as well as "for recording depositions and trial
proceedings." Id.
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(4) The authenticity of the testament.
(5) Matters that are determined by a court to be relevant
to the probate of the testament.
B. For purposes of the Article, "videotape" means the visual
recording on a magnetic tape, film, videotape, compact
disc, digital versatile disc, digital video disc, or by other
electronic means together with the associated oral
record.32
The purpose of article 2904 is to allow videotape to serve as
evidence of both the objective and subjective factors involved in
proving the validity of a testament. The article's similarity to the
Indiana statute is striking. Aside from the use of the word
"testament" rather than "will," the substantive provisions of each
statute are identical, insofar as the evidentiary role that videotape is
to play.33 This similarity suggests heavy reliance on the Indiana
version, as no substantive difference exists other than the addition
32. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2904 (2006) (amended 2005).
33. The legislative history of the article reveals that the legislature failed to
thoroughly consider the bill. When the bill was first presented to the House
Committee on Civil Law and Procedure on May 18, 2005, the sponsoring
representative gave a brief explanation of its effect. He stated that the bill
"would aid judges and lawyers in settling cases in which a will is disputed"
based on the fact that "the will might not make clear the recipients of assets
outlined in the will." Admissibility of a Videotape of the Execution of a
Testament: Hearing on H.B. 260 Before the H. Comm. on Civil Law and
Procedure, 2005 Reg. Sess. (La.) (statement of Rep. Willie Hunter, Jr.). He
added that "a testator's mental health and the authenticity of a signature might
also be in question." Id. He explained that "a videotape could resolve
uncertainties when determining the testator's intent regarding the will." Id.
Based on this brief recitation of the terms of the article, the Committee reported
the bill favorably. Id. There were no questions asked by the representatives
present at the committee meeting. Id. When the bill reached the House on May
23, it passed by a unanimous vote after only a single question. See La. H.R.
Session Day 17 (May 23, 2005) (Internet Live Video), available at
http://house.louisiana.gov/rmarchive/Ram/RamMay05/05RS-Dayl 7.ram. See
also source cited infra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing the single
question asked when the bill was read). On presentation to the Senate
Committee on Judiciary, Section A, a similarly brief statement was given by the
sponsoring representative. Statement of Rep. Hunter, supra note 5. The bill
was reported favorably, presented to the Senate, and unanimously approved.
See History of 2005 La. Acts No. 79, § 1, http://www.legis.state.la.us/ (last
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of procedural requirements absent from the Indiana provision34 and
the inclusion of the definition of "videotape," which is also missing
from the Indiana version.
Historically, courts have justified videotape admissibility
through Louisiana Code of Evidence article 402, which states: "All
relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Louisiana, this
Code of Evidence, or other legislation." 35 Relevant evidence is any
evidence having a "tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable." 36 Therefore, it follows that evidence that has been
documented through photographs, film, or videotape can be useful
for determining what took place during the event that is the subject
matter of the litigation.
37
Moreover, the admissibility of videotape is within the sound
discretion of the trial judge. 8 The trial judge must consider
"whether the videotape accurately depicts what it purports to
represent, whether it tends to establish a fact of the proponent's case,
and whether it will aid the jury's understanding ... [without]
prejudic[ing] or mislead[ing] the jury, confus[ing] the issues, or
caus[ing] undue delay." 39 Following such an approach, Louisiana
visited Aug. 23, 2006) (select "2005 Regular Session" from the drop down
menu; then select "Act," type "79," and click "View"; follow "History"
hyperlink).
34. Article 2904 requires the testator to be sworn by a person authorized to
take oaths. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2904 (2006) (amended 2005). See
sources cited infra notes 112-20 and accompanying text for a discussion about
these procedural requirements.
35. LA. CODE EvlD. ANN. art. 402 (2006).
36. LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 401 (2006).
37. Billie Colombaro Woodard, John W. deGravelles & David R. Frohn,
LOUISIANA PRACTICE SERIES: LOUISIANA CIVIL TRIAL PROCEDURE § 9.1 (2005).
38. Fryson v. Dupre Transp., 798 So. 2d 1012, 1016 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
writ denied, 804 So. 2d 631 (La. 2001); Our Lady of the Lake Reg'l Med. Ctr. v.
Helms, 754 So. 2d 1049, 1055 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1999), writ denied, 752 So. 2d
863 (La. 2000).
39. LeMasters v. Boyd Gaming Corp., 898 So. 2d 497, 505-06 (La. App.
5th Cir.), writ denied, 901 So. 2d 1103 (La. 2005).
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criminal courts have admitted videotapes showing murder scenes,4 °
as well as footage of armed robberies.4 1 Courts justify videotape
admissibility in the criminal context based on its ability to
"corroborate other testimony in a case, such as location of the body;
manner of death; specific intent to kill; number, location, and
severity of wounds; and cause of death.' ' 2 With respect to civil
actions, Louisiana courts have allowed videotape evidence in
products liability suits. 43  Courts have also admitted videotaped
depositions of witnesses. Notably, this admissibility has extended
into the probate process, documenting such events as interviews of
witnesses to aid in the determination of a testator's capacity.44
Therefore, the Louisiana Legislature's enactment of Code of Civil
Procedure article 2904, allowing for the admissibility of videotape
evidence in the probate setting, conforms with the general liberty
taken by Louisiana courts regarding the admissibility of videotape
evidence in other areas of the law.45
B. Step-by-Step Analysis ofArticle 2904 and Suggestions for
Improvement
Article 2904 contains five subsections, each representing an
element for which videotape evidence may be admissible.46 These
elements can be sorted into two categories: objective and subjective.
40. State v. Pooler, 696 So. 2d 22, 51 (La. App. 1 st Cir.), writ denied, 703
So. 2d 1288 (La. 1997).
41. State v. Lacoste, 237 So. 2d 871, 876 (La. 1970).
42. Pooler, 696 So. 2d at 50.
43. Laing v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 628 So. 2d 196, 203 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1993), writ denied, 635 So. 2d 239 (La. 1994).
44. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1440 (2006); Succession of Dowling,
633 So. 2d 846, 849 n.1 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994).
45. On the other hand, this willingness of courts to admit videotape
evidence as needed seems to eradicate the need for article 2904. See sources
cited infra notes 122-40 and accompanying text (discussing that videotape
evidence is already admissible under one or more of the exceptions to the
hearsay rules).
46. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2904 (2006) (amended 2005).
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1. Objective Factors: Proper Execution and Authenticity of the
Testament
Through article 2904, videotape evidence may be admissible as
proof of the proper execution of the testament under subsection one
and the authenticity of the testament under subsection four.47
i. Proper Execution
Regarding proper execution, videotape evidence may be a
valuable tool to ensure that codal requirements of form have been
met. According to Louisiana Civil Code article 1577, a notarial
testament must be prepared in writing, dated, and executed in the
presence of a notary and two competent witnesses. 48 During the
execution, the testator must declare or signify to these individuals
that the instrument is his testament and must sign his name at the
end of the document and on each of its pages.49  Likewise, the
notary and witnesses must, in the presence of the testator and each
other, sign a declaration certifying the events of the execution.
50
Because a videotape of the execution would capture whether the
testator, notary, and witnesses actually carried out these
requirements in each others' presence, the videotape can serve as
evidence of a testament's proper execution.5  Therefore, videotape
could solve problems such as the one that occurred in Succession of
Smith1
2
47. Id.
48. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1577 (2006).
49. Id. These requirements apply when the testator is literate and able to
sign his name. For the proper procedures to be carried out when the testator is
literate and sighted, but physically unable to sign, see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
1578 (2006); when the testator is unable to read, see LA. Cv. CODE ANN. art.
1579 (2006); and when the testator is deaf or deaf and blind, see LA. CIv. CODE
ANN. art. 1580.1 (2006).
50. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1577 (2006).
51. Beyer & Buckley, supra note 6, at 57 (describing how the videotape
could document the presence and proximity of the witnesses and testator).
52. 806 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 815 So. 2d 105 (La.
2002).
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In Smith, the testament at issue was executed in the testatrix's
hospital room. 53 The court found that the testatrix successfully
signed her name in the presence of the notary and witnesses, who
were nurses at the hospital, but there was a question as to whether
the witnesses' signing of the declaration was properly performed.
54
One of the nurse-witnesses left the room following the testatrix's
signing without first signing the declaration.55 He stated that he
thought his duty as a witness was over since the signing by the
testatrix had taken place and "the group began talking." 56 He later
signed the declaration at the nurses' station rather than in the
testatrix's room,57 but he "stated that he could see into the room
from the nurses' station and [the testatrix] could see him if she was
looking." 58  Despite this apparent physical proximity, the Smith
court found that these circumstances did not meet the "presence"
requirement of Civil Code article 1577 and declared the testament
null.5 9
Had a videotape of this execution been taken, the footage would
have revealed whether the testatrix, the notary, and the other witness
were in the "presence" of the witness who signed at the nurses'
station. Absent such a representation of the spatial relationship, the
court was forced to find the testament null. Furthermore, had a
videotape been utilized, perhaps the witness would not have left the
room at all-the fact that the recorder was still running would have
been an indication that the execution had not yet concluded.
But even with the objective issue of proper execution, use of a
videotape is still not without problems. For example, in the
Washington case In the Matter of Estate of Kessler, the court was
faced with conflicting evidence from witness testimony and
videotape as to whether a testament was properly executed.
Challengers to the will alleged that the document was not properly
executed because the videotape of the will signing did not show the
witnesses signing their names in the testatrix's presence or at her
53. Id. at 910.
54. Id. at 912.
55. Id. at 910.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 910-11.
58. Id. at911.
59. Id. at 912.
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direction as required by statute. 60 Rather than rely on the videotape,
the court opted to rely on witness testimony and found that the
witnesses had in fact signed their names in the presence of the
testatrix and at her direction or request.6 1  The Kessler court's
acceptance of witness testimony, despite its contradiction with
available videotape footage of the execution, reflects that witness
testimony is often treated by the courts as a form of evidence
superior to videotape.
The videotape involved in the Kessler proceeding apparently
failed to capture the entirety of the execution ceremony, as the
signing of the witnesses' declaration was omitted.62 Under article
2904, the procedural requirements would presumably prevent
admissibility of a videotape that did not capture the completed
execution. Still, the language of the statute does not expressly
exclude a videotape showing only a portion of the ceremony. 63 For
this reason, the legislature should amend the terms of article 2904 to
reflect that only a videotape showing a completed execution will be
admissible. Until that point, Louisiana courts should only rely on
such complete footage.
ii. Authenticity of the Testament
Although article 2904 adds to the fact-finding process with
respect to proper execution, any evidentiary support the article lends
to the issue of a testament's authenticity is trivial at best. As
described above, a notarial testament is executed before a notary and
two witnesses. 64 Since a notarial testament is an authentic act, it is,
by nature, a self-proving document.65 Absent a challenge to the
60. 977 P.2d 591, 605 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 597-98.
63. Article 2904 only states that "the videotape of the execution and reading
of the testament by the testator may be admissible .... ." LA. CODE Civ. PROC.
ANN. art. 2904 (2006) (amended 2005).
64. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1833 (2006).
65. This precept stems from Louisiana Civil Code article 1835: "An
authentic act constitutes full proof of the agreement it contains, as against the
parties, their heirs, and successors by universal or particular title." LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 1835 (2006). Further justification stems from Louisiana Code of
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testament, 66 this law-imposed status thus eliminates the need for avideotape to prove a testament's authenticity. 67
2. Subjective Factors: Testamentary Intentions, Capacity, and
Undue Influence
Videotape evidence may also be admissible as proof of the
testator's intentions under subsection two, the testator's capacity
under subsection three, and any other matters determined by a court
to be relevant to the testament's probate under subsection five.
68
i. Testamentary Intentions and Capacity
Regarding testamentary intentions and capacity, videotape
arguably aids the trier of fact since the footage displays the testator's
"dialogue, soliloquy, [and] conduct" during the execution.69 One
commentator describes videotape evidence as "clearly superior to
any secondary source of information regarding capacity inquiries."
70
This exalted status arises from the potential unreliability of
Civil Procedure article 2891: "A notarial testament . . .do[es] not need to be
proved." LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2891 (2006).
66. Should the testament be challenged, the burden of proving a lack of
authenticity is born by the proponent of the will. LA. CIV. CODE PROC. ANN. art.
2903 (2006). Because a testament's self-proving nature is not absolutely
conclusive and can be overcome, a videotape of the execution ceremony could
be relevant as a means to rebut the presumption of authenticity established in
Louisiana Civil Code article 1835. See sources cited supra note 65.
67. Article 2904 also adds nothing to the probate of olographic testaments
because such documents are not executed in authentic form. See LA. Civ. CODE
ANN. art. 1575 (2006). While the terms of the article do not expressly exclude
olographic wills, as a practical matter, the article does not apply to olographic
testaments. See id
68. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2904 (2006) (amended 2005).
69. Beyer & Buckley, supra note 6, at 57. Presumably, this reference to
videotape evidence assumes that the testator be allowed to speak freely about his
intentions. The current terms of article 2904 do not apply to this situation since
the videotape may only show the reading of the testament and the actual signing
of the document. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2904 (2006) (amended
2005).
70. Beyer & Buckley, supra note 6, at 56.
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testimony of relatives or friends on both sides of a will contest. 71
These parties often possess conflicting interests that may taint their
72
recollections.
At odds with this contention is the impression that the videotape
can "give a false appearance of ill health, frailty, nervousness and
confusion."73 Combining these problems with the notion that "most
people are . . . uncomfortable in front of a video camera,"
74
particularly "an elderly and infirm [individual who, when] the will
signing takes place[,] [is] in an unfamiliar location in front of
strangers,, 75 results in what could appear to be a physical
manifestation of a lack of testamentary capacity. Therefore, the
existence of subsections two and three of article 2904 may actually
encourage challengers to initiate will contests that they believe to be
buttressed by video evidence.
At least one court in Louisiana has addressed the issue of
videotape evidence and testamentary capacity. In 1994, over ten
years prior to the enactment of article 2904, the court in Corley v.
Munro admitted a videotape of a will execution ceremony in a will
contest. 76  The videotape was admitted to prove the testatrix's
capacity.77 The court ultimately held that the testatrix possessed
capacity despite evidence in the videotape that led one doctor to
conclude that the testatrix "did not know what she was doing from
one minute to the next."78 The court chose instead to rely on both
lay testimony at trial and the medical opinion of a psychiatrist who
examined the testatrix the day she executed the testament, which
revealed that she was competent and did in fact "[k]now what she
71. Id. at 55.
72. Id.
73. Hanson S. Reynolds, The Impact of Probate Litigation, in
SOPHISTICATED ESTATE PLANNING TECHNIQUES COSPONSORED BY
MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (1995), available at CA39
ALI-ABA 735 (Westlaw).
74. Robert Abrahams & William D. Zabel, Let's (Not) Go to the Videotape:
The Problem with Taping Will Executions, 219 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1998), available at
6/16/98 N.Y.L.J. 1 (Westlaw).
75. Id.
76. 631 So. 2d 708, 714 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 713.
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was doing."79  Accordingly, Corley stands for the principle that
Louisiana courts tend not to rely on videotape evidence to disprove
testamentary capacity when other evidence reveals its existence.
There is no reason why the enactment of article 2904 should change
this predilection. 8
0
In addition, these two subsections raise issues about which the
legislature has failed to properly instruct practitioners. For instance,
is the lawyer required to ask questions of the testator to determine
the intentions or the mental state or capacity of the testator?81 If so,
must the lawyer compile a script to make certain all issues are
covered during the videotaping? 2 One proponent of videotaping
seems to suggest that this is precisely what a lawyer should do.83 He
explains that the lawyer must instruct the testator to speak freely
regarding his or her intentions.8 4  To do so, the testator should
explain what he or she is doing on the videotape and that he or she
understands what is taking place.8 5 This procedure has the effect of
giving the lawyer a script that he may then turn over to the testator
to read to the camera. For example, one commentator states: "the
videocamera should then focus on a dialogue between the testator
and the attorney. This should include the testator identifying
himself and explaining the function of a will; i.e., a document which
will dispose of his property upon death.",86 Moreover, "[t]he testator
should identify the actual will document as being his final wishes
regarding the disposition of property at death.",87 In this way, the
79. Id. at 709, 713.
80. See sources cited infra notes 122-40 and accompanying text (discussing
how videotape evidence was already admissible in the probate process under
Louisiana law prior to the enactment of article 2904, leading to the conclusion
that the article does not change the law, but merely codifies videotape
admissibility in the probate process).
81. Carey J. Messina, Videotaping the Last Will and Testament, Louisiana
Law Blog, http://www.louisianalawblog.com/108-print.html (July 15, 2005)
(last visited Aug. 23, 2006).
82. Id.
83. Gerry W. Beyer, Videotaping the Will Execution Ceremony-Preventing
Frustration of the Testator's Final Wishes, 15 ST. MARY's L.J. 1, 12 (1983).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 29.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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lawyer is effectively telling the testator what to say and how to say
it. Simply because the testator says he intends to bequeath certain
property to particular legatees following instruction by his attorney
to do so in no way reflects the testator's capacity and intentions,
other than his capacity to follow directions well.
Furthermore, it is questionable if videotape of an interview
session is even admissible under article 2904. The current language
of the article stipulates that only "videotape of the execution [i.e. the
actual signing] and reading of the testament" may be admissible.
Reasoning a contrario, it appears that a question and answer session
is not covered by article 2904. To this end, the legislature should
revisit subsections two and four, particularly as to the admissibility
of an interview session under article 2904. Presumably, videotape
of a question and answer session would be admissible under current
Louisiana evidentiary rules.88 Still, for the sake of simplicity, article
2904 should expressly state that the session is admissible. 89 The
testator's mere signing and reading of the testament aloud9° fails to
capture an adequate visual display of testamentary intentions and
88. See sources cited infra notes 122-40 and accompanying text (discussing
other theories by which videotape evidence is already admissible under
Louisiana law).
89. As support for this proposition, the bill considered by the New Jersey
Legislature would have allowed for the admissibility of an interview session:
"The attorney shall question the testator during the filming of the videotape to
demonstrate the testator's sound mind and satisfactory memory and
understanding of the event." Assemb. B. 3030, 202d Leg., 1st yr. Sess. (N.J.
1986). Also, a reference manual for continuing legal education published by the
Ohio Legal Center advises lawyers to "[q]uestion [the] testator as to [the]
possibility of undue influence," and to have the testator "explain[] his
disposition plan with reasons." REFERENCE MANUAL FOR CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION No. 154 (Ohio Legal Center Inst. Publication 1985).
90. For purposes of this comment, the language of article 2904 allowing for
the admissibility of a "videotape of. . . [the] reading of the testament" has been
interpreted to indicate a reading of the testament aloud. See LA. CODE CIV.
PROC. ANN. art. 2904 (2006) (amended 2005). Support for this interpretation
lies in the fact that it defies comprehension to assume that a videotape of a
testator silently reading a copy of the testament would be probative of any of the
factors listed in article 2904, particularly those of testamentary intentions and
capacity. See sources cited infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text
(discussing the only situation prior to the enactment of article 2904 when a
reading of the testament must be carried out during the execution ceremony).
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capacity.91 To capture these subjective factors so that the videotape
can effectively serve the evidentiary purpose contemplated in the
article, a lawyer must be allowed to draw out these factors from the
testator's mind by asking questions of the testator. Such action by
the legislature would greatly enhance the effectiveness of
subsections two and four.
ii. Other Matters Determined by a Court to be Relevant to the
Testament's Probate
Regarding the final subsection of article 2904, one matter that a
court could find relevant to the probate of the testament is the
existence of undue influence. 92 A number of commentators insist
that "videotape could dispel accusations of undue influence
employed during the will execution." 93 At first glance, the ability to
introduce videotape evidence of the will execution ceremony seems
to be an effective means of disproving undue influence. If videotape
evidence was a foolproof solution, the logical result would be the
cessation altogether of will contests brought on grounds of undue
influence.
94
91. It appears that the representative sponsoring article 2904 did not take
into account the fact that the article, as written, allows for the admissibility of a
videotape showing only the signing of the testament and a reading aloud of its
terms. See La. H.R. Session Day 17, supra note 33. In his presentation of the
bill to the House, this representative stated that practitioners should "take a
videotape [of the execution ceremony] and video also what their [the testator's]
intentions were in the will." Id. By nature, it is impossible to videotape an
individual's intentions. The closest a practitioner can come is to ask questions
of the testator in an attempt to bring out such intentions.
92. The cause of action for annulling a testament on grounds of undue
influence is found in Louisiana Civil Code article 1479. See LA. Civ. CODE
ANN. art. 1479 (2006).
93. Beyer & Buckley, supra note 6, at 60. See also Buckley, supra note 17,
at 88-89.
94. See generally Beyer & Buckley, supra note 6 (arguing that videotape
evidence of the will execution process could be used to discourage or ultimately
win will contests); Lisa L. McGarry, Note, Videotaped Wills: An Evidentiary
Tool or a Written Will Substitute?, 77 IOWA L. REv. 1187, 1197 (1992) (stating
that videotape evidence "[m]ay deter many will contests by disgruntled
relatives" through its ability to display the testator's final wishes to the trier of
fact).
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In reality though, videotape evidence simply does not provide
concrete proof of the lack of undue influence, given its highly
subjective and fact-based nature.95 Aspects of undue influence are
usually veiled in secrecy, 96 and for this reason, undue influence is
generally proven by circumstantial evidence, such as witness
accounts of the testator's behavior toward family members. 97 More
often, "there is seldom ever any direct proof of undue influence
since it usually occurs when no one else is present and it is
accomplished in a subtle way."
98
In response, one commentator suggests that the testator could
"[i]n his own words.., explain on the videotape that the disposition
being made is a result of his [or her] free will and that the decision
as to property disposition was not influenced by overreaching on the
part of anyone." 99 This approach fails to consider that the testator
could just as easily have been unduly influenced to say these things,
particularly if he lacks the capacity to think for himself. While
videotape showing "the testator's recitation, . . . demeanor on
camera, and attitude toward the written will may provide excellent
and timely evidence that the testator voluntarily signed the
instrument,"' 00 if undue influence is present, the testator may very
well behave as if the signing of the instrument is voluntary. As a
result, the testator will not appear hesitant or uncertain, behavioral
traits that proponents of videotape admissibility often cite as
evidence of undue influence.' 01
As justification for the principle that videotape adds little to the
determination of undue influence, many jurisdictions admit
videotape as evidence during the probate process but rely upon other
95. Julia Cowan Spear, Comment, Undue Influence in Louisiana.: What It
Was, What It is, What It Might Be, 43 LOY. L. REv. 443, 473 (1997).
96. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1479 cmt. (b) (2006).
97. Id.
98. In re Estate of Smith, 827 So. 2d 673, 676 (Miss. 2002).
99. Beyer, supra note 83, at 7. Admissibility of such a discourse would
require the same action by the legislature as mentioned supra note 89 and
accompanying text.
100. Beyer & Buckley, supra note 6, at 60.
101. According to one commentator, videotape evidence would preserve
"nonverbal evidence such as demeanor, voice tone and inflection, facial
expressions, and gestures," evidence that is "crucial in determining ... freedom
from undue influence." Id. at 50.
888 [Vol. 67
COMMENTS
evidence in ascertaining whether undue influence exists. For
example, in the Nebraska case In re Estate of Peterson, the court
held that the testatrix's execution of a codicil increasing the share of
property bequeathed to her son who helped manage the family farm
was not the result of any undue influence exerted by the son.'
02
While a videotape of the execution ceremony was admitted, 10 3 the
court did not rely on the videotape for its determination. Instead, the
court based its holding on witness testimony and on the terms of the
testament itself. The court's reliance on witness testimony was not
limited to witnesses involved in the execution ceremony but
included witnesses who had heard the testatrix relate her intentions
regarding her desired beneficiaries.' 0 4 Furthermore, in reasoning
that none of the evidence presented suggested the presence of undue
influence,' 0 5 the court asserted that "[r]ather, the terms of the codicil
reflected [the testatrix's] recognition of the special business
relationship she had with [her son]."' 0 6 Other than noting what was
captured on the videotape, the court did not make use of the
videotape's contents in deciding that no undue influence existed.
1 0 7
Even courts that find undue influence often do not base their
holdings on available videotape evidence. For example, in Ex parte
Baker, the Alabama Supreme Court mentioned that a videotape of
the execution ceremony was made but opted instead to rely on other
evidence to demonstrate undue influence. 10 8  In finding undue
influence, the court relied upon witness testimony revealing the
confidential relationship shared by the testatrix and her daughter-in-
law; the daughter-in-law's control over the testatrix's household,
medical, and financial affairs; and the daughter-in-law's active
participation in procuring the execution of the will.10 9 Therefore,
the evidence found by the court to be telling of undue influence was
102. 439 N.W.2d 516, 520 (Neb. 1989).
103. Id. at 521.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 520.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 519.
108. 709 So. 2d 7, 9 (Ala. 1997).
109. Id.
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not contained in the videotape, nor could it be, for all the events
occurred prior to the will execution.' 1
0
Peterson and Baker stand for the principle that videotape
frequently fails to serve as valuable evidence in actions challenging
a testament's validity on the basis of undue influence. In particular,
Baker reveals that oftentimes the best evidence of undue influence is
not found at the execution but rather in events leading up to the
execution. As a result, courts repeatedly choose not to rely on the
contents of videotape and focus instead on the contents of the
testament itself and on witness testimony. Knowing this, Louisiana
courts should not allow the enactment of article 2904 to alter their
determinations of undue influence."' Courts should not create a
negative inference of undue influence simply because a lawyer
opted not to record a will's execution.
C. Additional Technical Deficiencies ofArticle 2904
In addition to the evidentiary problems associated with each
subsection of article 2904, several procedural deficiencies also exist.
First, the language of the article states that a reading of the testament
is to be carried out "by the testator."' 1 2 Without allowing for an
exception to this rule, the article fails to take into account the
situation of the illiterate or blind testator. Under Louisiana Civil
Code article 1579, if the testator is unable to read, the testament
must be read aloud in his presence, usually by the notary. 113 In fact,
it is ordinarily only in this type of situation when a "reading" of the
testament is done at all, 1 making the requirement of a reading
aloud under article 2904 somewhat peculiar. Nevertheless, it is
unclear if a videotape of an execution involving an illiterate or blind
testator would be admissible under article 2904. Even if it is
admissible, such a videotape would add nothing to a determination
110. Id.
111. See sources cited infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text for further
suggestions regarding proper interpretation of article 2904.
112. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2904 (2006) (amended 2005).
113. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1579 (2006).
114. See LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 1577 cmt. (f) (2006) (explaining that the
testator is not required to actually read the testament at the time of its
execution).
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of the subjective factors, such as testamentary intent and capacity,
since the only action carried out by the testator captured on the
videotape would be his physical act of signing. Therefore, these
circumstances also support the admissibility of a question and
answer session during the execution.' 1
5
A second deficiency concerns the requirement that the testator
must be "sworn by a person authorized to take oaths." 1 6  The
language of the article fails to clarify basic requirements about this
oath. For instance, what is the content of the oath taken? Since
testators do not normally take oaths, a practitioner may be uncertain
as to how to proceed under this article in order to ensure that the
videotape will be admissible.
This lack of clarity was evidenced even by legislators as the bill
was presented to the House of Representatives. 7 One legislator
posed the question: "Is it going to take a separate swearing by a
court reporter or will the normal attestation clause be enough under
this bill?" The representative sponsoring the bill that eventually
became article 2904 responded: "The normal one should be enough,
but the video will occur at the same time that you're doing the will."
The questioner continued: "But I usually don't make them say it out
loud; do you think we're now going to have to say it out loud?" The
sponsoring representative replied: "I have them say it out loud."
The questioner continued: "What do you think under the bill is
going to be required?" The sponsoring representative replied:
"They will have to manifest that this is their will and testament."
This "normal attestation clause" apparently referred to by the
representatives is described in Louisiana Civil Code article 1577:
"the testator shall declare or signify [to the notary and two
competent witnesses] that the instrument is his testament.
' ' 18
115. See sources cited supra note 89 and accompanying text.
116. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2904 (2006) (amended 2005).
117. The following exchange was transcribed from archived footage of the
House proceedings on the day the bill creating article 2904 was voted on by the
House of Representatives. See Video of House Proceedings, Final Passage of HB
260, http://house.louisiana.gov/rmarchive/Ram/RamMay05/05RS-Dayl 7.ram.
118. The only other attestation clause the representatives could be referring
to is the one contained at the end of the testament signed by the witnesses rather
than the testator and certifying that the execution was properly performed. See
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1577(2) (2006). In fact, another source of confusion
2007]
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According to comment (c) of this article, "[t]he testator's indication
that the instrument contains his last wishes may be given verbally or
in any other manner that indicates his assent to its provisions."' 1 9
As the comment suggests, this communication by the testator is
merely an "indication" rather than an "attestation clause" or an oath.
To qualify as an oath under Louisiana law, presumably its
content should conform to that required by Louisiana Code of
Evidence article 603, which states: "Before testifying, every witness
shall be required to declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or
affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken his
conscience and impress his mind with his duty to do so.' 20 Also, it
would seem that the oath should be administered by a person
authorized to administer oaths, as per Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 1434 applicable to oaths involved in the taking of
depositions and worded similarly to article 2904. Without answers
to these questions, there exists a serious risk that a videotape made
in a good faith attempt to conform to article 2904 might not be
admissible.
Article 2904 was drafted and subsequently enacted without input
from the Louisiana State Law Institute. As evidenced by its many
inadequacies, it is hoped that the legislature will refer the matter to
the State Law Institute to help clarify the article with comments.
Regardless, unless and until the legislature properly accounts for
these unresolved issues, article 2904 will fail to have its intended
evidentiary effect.
regarding the representatives' exchange is that the term "attestation clause"
normally refers only to this declaration made by the witnesses rather than any
declaration by the testator. Max Nathan, Jr. & Carole Cukell Neff, 2 LOUISIANA
ESTATE PLANNING, WILL DRAFTING AND ESTATE ADMINISTRATION WITH FORMS
6 (Matthew Bender & Co., 2d ed. 2004) (1959).
119. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1577 cmt. (c) (2006) (emphasis added).
Therefore, prior to article 2904, there was no requirement that the testator make
this assertion "out loud."
120. LA. CODE EviD. ANN. art. 603 (2006).
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D. The Potential for Increased Litigation
Article 2904 may have the regrettable effect of increasing
actions to annul testaments seemingly buttressed by videotape
evidence. In fact, clients often agree to the excess costs associated
with videotaping the will execution ceremony "in the hope that it
will assure victory over challengers"'' 2 1 to the testament.
Challengers, however, may then attack the same video alleging that
the testator's actions show, for instance, that the testator lacked
capacity or was unduly influenced. Now that Louisiana has enacted
legislation devoted specifically to the admissibility of videotape
evidence, its use by attorneys and clients in the probate process is
likely to increase.
1. Article 2904 is Somewhat Superfluous
It is important to note initially that article 2904's authorization
of videotape admissibility is at best somewhat superfluous when
considered in light of the fact that videotape can already be
introduced under a myriad of theories.' 
22
First, most states' rules of evidence allow videotape to be
admitted. Although the only state to enact legislation on the subject
prior to Louisiana was Indiana, many other states have case law
allowing videotape to be admitted in the probate process. 23 Even
Louisiana, under its Code of Evidence, allowed a videotape of a will
execution to be admitted prior to the enactment of article 2904.124
To be admissible, videotape must survive a potentially fatal
objection to its admissibility, namely, the possibility that it may be
considered hearsay. Louisiana Code of Evidence article 802 states
that "[h]earsay is not admissible except as otherwise provided by
this Code or other legislation."' 125  Hearsay is defined in the
121. Abrahams & Zabel, supra note 74.
122. The argument can be made that article 2904 is not superfluous at all.
Rather, for the sake of simplicity, its terms are actually beneficial because it
allows for the admission of videotape without contest. However, as evidenced
by the contents of this comment, article 2904 as currently written actually
creates more problems than it solves.
123. See sources cited supra notes 102, 108 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Corley v. Munro, 631 So. 2d 708 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
125. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 802 (2006).
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preceding article as "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the present trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."' 26 Hearsay
evidence is excluded because "the value of the statement rests on the
credibility of the out-of-court asserter who is not subject to cross-
examination and other safeguards of reliability."'
127
In the case of probate litigation, if videotape evidence is
admitted, statements made by the testator during the testament's
execution could be considered hearsay if the videotape is admitted
to demonstrate the truth of these statements. For example, the
testator's declaration that the document being executed is his "last
will and testament" could technically be considered hearsay if the
videotape's admission is for the purpose of proving testamentary
intent. In this case, the testator is clearly unavailable for cross-
examination purposes.
However, if the videotape is admitted as proof of something
other than the truth of the testator's statements-for example,
testamentary capacity-it would fall outside of the scope of the
hearsay rule. 128 This is because "evidence of the mental state or
intent of the testator may be reflected by the testator's statements"
made on videotape, but such evidence is "not conditioned on the
statements' truthfulness."'129 Therefore, such statements would not
be considered hearsay.
Should videotape be deemed hearsay, it still can be admissible
under one of several exceptions to the hearsay rule,' 30 including
present sense impression; then existing mental, emotional, or
physical condition; 132 and recorded recollection.' 33 To illustrate, in
126. LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 801 (2006).
127. State v. Brown, 562 So. 2d 868, 877 (La. 1990) (citing State. v. Martin,
458 So. 2d 454 (La. 1984)).
128. Id.
129. Beyer, supra note 83, at 8-9.
130. See Beyer & Buckley, supra note 6, at 64-65; Beyer, supra note 83, at
14-16.
131. This exception to the hearsay rule allows for admissibility of "[a]
statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the
declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter." LA.
CODE EviD. ANN. art. 803(1) (2006).
132. This exception to the hearsay rule allows for admissibility of "[a]
statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or
[Vol. 67
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the example given above where the testator declares that the
document being executed is his "last will and testament," this
statement of testamentary intent, although hearsay, would be
admissible as a present sense impression.' 34 The rationale behind
this exception to the hearsay rule lies in the contention that "the
substantial contemporaneousness of the event and the statement
negates the likelihood of deliberate or conscious
misrepresentation."' 135  Likewise, statements reflecting proper
execution, testamentary capacity, testamentary intent, and lack of
undue influence likely fall under the then existing mental,
emotional, or physical condition exception to the hearsay rule. 136 In
the context of a testament's execution, even statements of memory
or belief are admissible to prove "the fact remembered or
believed."' 1
37
If the testator's statements do not fit under one of these
exceptions, the unavailability' 38 or "catch-all 1 39 exceptions may
apply. The catch-all exceptions found in Louisiana Code of
Evidence article 804(B)(6) allow admissibility of evidence as long
as the statement is trustworthy, is offered as evidence of a material
fact, and "the proponent of the evidence has adduced or made a
physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain,
and bodily health), offered to prove the declarant's then existing condition or his
future action." LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 803(3) (2006).
133. This exception to the hearsay rule allows for admissibility of "[a]
memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had
knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully
and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the
matter was fresh in his memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly." LA.
CODE EviD. ANN. art. 803(5) (2006).
134. Beyer, supra note 83, at 14.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 15.
137. LA. CODE EviD. ANN. art. 803(3) (2006).
138. A declarant is unavailable as a witness when he or she "cannot ...
appear in court and testify to the substance of his statement made outside of
court." LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 804(A) (2006). This includes situations in
which the declarant is "unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because
of death." Id.
139. LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 804(B)(6) (2006). See also Beyer, supra note
83, at 15.
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reasonable effort to adduce all other admissible evidence to establish
the fact to which the proffered statement relates.'
' 40
Because videotape evidence generally falls under these
exceptions to the hearsay rule, there already exists extensive
grounds on which such evidence could be admitted. Since
videotape evidence was already admissible under Louisiana law
prior to the enactment of article 2904, this article does not change
the law, it just expressly allows for videotape admissibility in the
probate process.
2. Risk of Increased Litigation
Article 2904 may also have the effect of exacerbating the
instances of litigation brought by beneficiaries under the will since it
may provide a malpractice cause of action against lawyers for
failing to make a videotape. Counter to this principle, one
commentator explains that the "failure of an attorney to prepare a
videotape of the will execution ceremony under circumstances
where the reasonably prudent attorney would do so does not lead to
malpractice liability ...because the lack of privity between the
attorney and the intended will beneficiaries bars the action.' 4 1 For
instance, in an unreported Ohio case, In re Estate of Nibert,142 the
court indicated that the will beneficiaries' lawyer was not
responsible for delays and additional costs resulting from prolonged
litigation for failing to videotape the will execution ceremony.143
The court noted that this premise assumes, but does not suggest, that
a videotape would actually have helped to corroborate issues such as
testamentary capacity and the presence of undue influence, thus
cutting short the protracted litigation.44
Contrary to Nibert, however, this privity defense is only
maintained by a few states. 145 As a result, beneficiaries to the will
may assert their malpractice claims against lawyers who fail to
140. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 804(B)(6) (2006).
141. Beyer & Buckley, supra note 6, at 48.
142. No. 88-02-004, 1988 WL 102420 (Ohio App. 12 Dist. Sept. 30, 1988).
143. Id. at *5.
144. Id.
145. Reynolds, supra note 73, at 745.
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videotape the execution ceremony. 146 Such is the case in Louisiana.
Malpractice liability with respect to beneficiaries of a will in
Louisiana is based on the idea that the "intended legatee under a will
is considered a direct, explicit third-party beneficiary of the contract
for legal services between the attorney and the testator so that, in the
event the will is invalid, the legatee can have a cause of action
against the attorney."'147 More specifically, under Louisiana law,
this contract between the lawyer and the testator to create a will for
the benefit of the legatees is considered a stipulation pour autrui, or
a stipulation for a third party, under Louisiana Civil Code article
1978.148 By law, third party beneficiaries to a stipulation pour
autrui may sue for its breach. 
4 9
The Louisiana Supreme Court first set forth its opinion
regarding the lack of a privity defense in Succession of
Killingsworth v. Schlater.150 The issue before the court was whether
a notary is liable to legatees under a will declared invalid as a result
of his failure to use proper care in its formation.' 5' The court
subsequently found that he was.' 52 The court reasoned that the lack
of attorney-client privity between the attorney and beneficiaries was
not determinative in finding the existence of a stipulation pour
146. For example, the defense is not recognized in New Hampshire. See
Simpson v. Calivas, 650 A.2d 318 (N.H. 1994). In Simpson, the court upheld a
malpractice action against the draftsman of a will who failed to provide a
bequest for the plaintiff-heir. Id. at 323. While Simpson does not involve
malpractice liability with respect to failure to videotape per se, it still stands for
the premise that beneficiaries to a will may bring claims against the lawyer
responsible for the will based on the theory that an intended beneficiary may
enforce the terms of a contract as a third-party beneficiary. Id.
147. Desire Narcotics Rehab. Ctr., Inc. v. White, 732 So. 2d 144 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1999) (citing Succession of Killingsworth v. Schlater, 292 So. 2d 536
(La. 1973)).
148. Succession of Killingsworth v. Schlater, 292 So. 2d 536, 542-43 (La.
1973).
149. The "stipulation that a lawyer is to confect a will to institute third
part[y] legatees is a stipulation pour autrui... for damages breach of which the
third party may sue." Id. at 542 (emphasis added) (quoting Woodfork v.
Sanders, 248 So. 2d 419 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 252 So. 2d 455 (La.
1971)).
150. See generally id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 543.
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autrui,153 ultimately holding that "an attorney's clear error in
confecting a will, which the exercise of a reasonable competence
would have avoided, constitutes a breach of the contractual
stipulation for the benefit of the intended legatee."'
' 54
Killingsworth could be interpreted to mean that there is no
privity defense protecting Louisiana lawyers from malpractice
claims by beneficiaries to a will. However, the status of the defense
applied to a lawyer's failure to videotape a will execution may not
be so clear since the holding in Killingsworth involved an error by a
lawyer which "the exercise of reasonable competence would have
avoided.' 55  Consequently, application of the Killingsworth
approach assumes not only that a lawyer of reasonable competence
would have opted to videotape the will execution ceremony, but also
that the videotape would have helped the disappointed beneficiaries.
To this end, article 2904 is of no help in determining whether a
lawyer of "reasonable competence" would videotape the execution.
Its language imposes no obligation to videotape a will execution, but
provides only that videotape evidence "may" be admitted. 1
56
Since there is no requirement to videotape, how is a lawyer
supposed to know when to videotape the execution ceremony? A
proponent of videotaping suggests that the lawyer should predict,
based on the individual client, if there will be a challenge to the
will. 57 For instance, "if [the] client is elderly or ill, [an] estate
planner may anticipate a challenge to the will... based on lack of
testamentary capacity or susceptibility to undue influence."'
158
While the ability to predict a challenge to the will under these
circumstances may be possible, how is a lawyer to predict in
circumstances where the client is not elderly or ill? This suggestion
effectively requires the lawyer to possess extra-sensory perception.
Another proponent offers the advice that videotaping should not
be used in "relatively docile estate proceedings,"' 59 as "not all
153. d.
154. Id. (quoting Woodfork v. Sanders, 248 So. 2d 419 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
writ denied, 252 So. 2d 455 (La. 1971)).
155. Id.
156. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2904 (2006) (amended 2005).
157. Reynolds, supra note 73, at 745.
158. Id.
159. Buckley, supra note 17, at 90.
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families erupt into vicious probate battles which span decades of
spite and venom." 160 Again, this method presupposes that a lawyer
will be able to ascertain the nature of the proceedings prior to the
testator's death. Since the lawyer's abilities are not always
foolproof, it is likely that situations will arise where a lawyer does
not videotape the execution, and beneficiaries may bring
malpractice claims as a result.
There is also a risk if the lawyer decides to videotape. A leading
Louisiana lawyer in the area of probate law cautions that "two
interesting questions may be asked at trial with respect to a
videotaped execution of a will: (1) Do you videotape all executions
of wills by your clients? and (2) Why did you videotape this
one?"'161 Since videotape is not required under article 2904, unless a
lawyer decides to videotape all executions, he or she risks that the
decision to videotape in a particular instance will indirectly reflect
the lawyer's own opinion or fear that there may be a will contest. In
a close case, this subtle maneuver may influence the court to find
against the will's validity.
This occurrence, combined with the uncertain status of the
privity defense under Louisiana law, will likely lead to the undesired
result of increased litigation in the probate arena. Although
videotape evidence arguably is already admissible and thus the
concern regarding attorney liability already exists, the codification
of this principle through article 2904 concretely sets forth a new
basis for malpractice suits against lawyers who fail to offer a
videotape option to their clients.
Article 2904 fails to offer guidance to practitioners regarding
potential liability for failing to videotape the execution ceremony.
Its terms only suggest that a videotape of the execution and reading
of the testament "may" be admissible. 162 In fact, based on means by
which videotape is already admissible, no one would question its
admissibility absent article 2904. As a result, the legislature would
do justice to practitioners to expressly set forth a lawyer's potential
liability or denial thereof under article 2904 for failure to videotape
a testament's execution.
160. Id.
161. Nathan & Neff, supra note 118, at 138.
162. LA. CODE C1V. PROC. ANN. art. 2904 (2006) (amended 2005).
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E. Suggestion for the Interpretation ofArticle 2904
In addition to the suggestions to the legislature set forth above
regarding clarification of the article's provisions, courts must
interpret article 2904 to best serve the interests of justice. In
general, Louisiana courts should allow videotape evidence to stand
as evidence of proper execution, but judges must be wary of the
article's usefulness for purposes of the more subjective factors such
as testamentary capacity and undue influence.
Courts should continue to rely on witness testimony as the best
approach in determining the validity of a testament. According to
one commentator, it is "far preferable for [a] lawyer to have ...
paralegal witnesses who can testify to their observing testators sign
wills in many, many cases and whose appraisal of the testator's
competence and understanding will be persuasive."' 63 As evidenced
in the case In the Matter of Estate of Kessler,164 witness testimony,
despite a contradiction with available videotape, is a superior form
of evidence.
In short, article 2904 should not be interpreted as adding
anything of substance to the existing means of videotape
admissibility. Given its cursory legislative adoption, it is
questionable if its enactment can be construed as a source of
legislative support for the effectiveness of videotape in the probate
process. Therefore, courts should not change their approach
regarding videotape evidence, which, until this point, has been not to
grant it much consideration at all.1
65
IV. CONCLUSION
The legislators failed to debate thoroughly all possible issues
when they unanimously voted to approve new Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure article 2904.166 The resulting article is in great need
of assistance. Aside from its potential ability to aid in a court's
determination of whether the testamentary execution was carried out
according to proper codal requirements, the article does not add any
163. Reynolds, supra note 73, at 745.
164. 977 P.2d 591 (Wash. App. 1999). See source cited supra notes 60-61.
165. See, e.g., Corley v. Munro, 631 So. 2d 708 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
166. See sources cited supra note 33 and accompanying text.
900 [Vol. 67
COMMENTS
additional support to a beneficiary's action to probate a testament or
a challenger's action to annul a probated testament. As a result,
Louisiana courts should not grant article 2904 undue importance.
Likewise, practitioners must be wary of its potential effects. One
commentator warns that the process of videotaping will "likely
require longer office appointments and greater preparation [resulting
in larger bills to clients] than presently needed to execute wills.' ' 6
Practitioners must also be aware of the risk that article 2904 could
exacerbate malpractice actions for failure to videotape.' 
68
The fact remains, the vast majority of other states that have
considered similar legislation did so in the late 1980s. 169 The only
state to enact legislation was Indiana in 1988,170 while all other
states that proposed legislation opted not to do so. Why, then, did
Louisiana choose to take action in 2005, nearly twenty years later?
Such action was not well considered, 17 1 as evidenced by the
deficiencies associated with the article; the legislature must make
amends.
Alison V. Nunez*
167. Buckley & Buckley, supra note 18, at 4.
168. Id.
169. See sources cited supra notes 22-23, 25.
170. See sources cited supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
171. See sources cited supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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